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S'l'ATE.MENT OF .FACT, CORRECTIONS
The defendant contends the road is not contiguous.
This is contradicted by plaintiffs. The Defendant conteu<ls there were absolutely no other openings. Aerial
1

photos of government show a number of openings auc
entrances, one being just a few feet from the northea.
corner of the plaintiff property.
1

The Defendants claim the blacktop in the roaL
was 7 to 14 feet from plaintiffs. line while close exanu
nation of Exhibits D-9 and D-19 will show that tlit
fence from which distance was measured was as muchai
3 feet inside the section line which was the property liut
making the distance to the black top three feet shorter i
those places.
11

The Def en clan ts claimed the roadway iu front ut
J esf)op's property was left intact, which is not true a
one half of the roadway from the middle of the lot to tht
east end was torn up preventing Jessops from driving
in on the west and turning, and coming back on the road
on the east without backing their car, which is now net
essary. They only left about 39.6 feet of the road intact
The Defendants contend a pile of dirt was put
in 1960 and they scarified the old road so it was not
passable. All of the witnesses testified that the road wa:
usable until 1964 and there was no rebutting
to this.
The Plaintiffs saved a one acre piece for building
purposes on the old road. There was enough land to put
two lots on the north end and two on the south-all 7.1
feet wide by 150 feet deep.
Plaintiffs were never told of the intended closiuµ
and no notice of abandonment was given. The
2

plaintiffs knew of the exact time of taking was when the
deed from the county was presented in court. The Defendant Soter's Inc. had the county approve a subdivision which took the road and made it a part of the subdivision put plaintiffs' sewer and manhole on Soter's
land, making the use of the facilities almost impossible.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT SOTER'S HAS DEPRIVED THE PLAINTIFFS OF THEIR
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.
It is conceded that the county, under its police power,
power, could deed away its rights to the property but
that does not deprive the plaintiffs of their rights in the
road, and the defendant Soter's Inc. took the county's
right in the road subject to plaintiff's claim. It is clear
that this road was a public road and had been for more
than ten years, and the plaintiffs had a vested right in
the road as shown by the statute previously cited, giving
them an absolute right to the center of the road.

The case at hand is clearly a suit against defendant
Soter's Inc. for depriving plaintiffs of their property
without just compensation for the two building lots on
the south side of the road, and just compensation therefor would clearly be the market value of the lots.

3

The defendants make much of the definition of tht
words abut and abutting and we all know what abut
means, but it does not mean that the black top has to ru 11
to the property line to make the road an abutting roau
but only to the place where it can reasonably be used br
the public. On Creek Road the old road was as close t;
the fence line in front of plaintiffs' property as it is t
all the other property from 13th East to plaintiffs' land
a distance of approximately 11/2 miles and for the de.
fendants to contend that every inch of the road was not
used from the property line to the black top is carrying
the postulate from the sublime to the rediculous. Noone
is claiming or has claimed the strip between the blad
top and the fence on any of the rest of the properties on
the same side of the road. To be specific, there was never
any showing or any claim of use of the land by am
other person for the property between the plaintiff'\
line and the black top.
1

11

The defendants make much of the fact that !ht
previous citations used in plaintiffs brief were from con·
demnation proceedings and they feel that we have mis·
conceived our case. \iV e claim that the cases cited clear!)
show that property including the specific right of acces1
cannot be taken from a person without just compensa·
tion being paid therefor and that practically every state
recognizes the right of access as a separate property
right for which the owner of the right should be com·
pensated.
4

They cite the cases of Fairclough v. Salt Lake
Count;y, 10 U.2d 417, 354 P. 2d 105 and the case ot
Sine v. Holland, 18 U.2d 222, 418 P.2d 979, both ot
which were mandamus cases to compel public officials
and the county to bring condemnation proceedings
whereby the owners of the property could be properly
compensated for loss access and damages. The court
very properly held that the state and its agency, the
county, could not be compelled to bring condemnation
proceedings against its desire the county and the state
had not waived its immunity and could not be sued
without consent and the cases were dismissed. The court
holdings in each case that the state had used its police
power reasonably. In these instances the principle that
property cannot be taken without just compensation
was pitted against the principle of the immunity of
the government from suit and the court properly held
the government was immune from suit in any case.
\Ve point out that Judge Hansen cited the Fairclou,gh case and also the case of the Springville Banking
Co. v. C. Taylor Burton, IO U.2d 100, 349 P.2d 157,
which was also a mandamus case and is clearly distinguishable from the present case. This case clearly established that no abutting property owner has a compensable right in the flow of traffic. The plaintiffs are suing
a private individual who has no immunity and one who
doesn't have police power of the county as a protection
for its acts and clearly is liable in damages to the plaintiffs for damage done for the loss of access.

5

The defendants also cite Utah Road Commission
v. Hansen, 14 U .2d 305, 383
917, which case eveu
from their own citation shows the Hansens were enhtleii
to compensation reasonable access. In the presellt cast
there is no access reasonable or otherwise. lu the Hausen case the court held that the loss of access had already been computed in the damages when there was au
allowance for severance which clearly amounts to pay
ment for the loss of access.
The defendants state that the abutter is not entitled to access at all points of his property but in this
particular instance he was abutting the road and cou!J
choose where he wanted to go on to it just as every
other property holder along Creek Road chose the place
where they wished to drive on to the road.
The defendants make much of the fact that therr
had not been a right-of-way established from plaintiff,
land onto this road. Here the plaintiffs were letting the
land lie idle until they wanted to build or sell to some om
else to build. One acre with rather poor soil would not be
profitable to farm. Under the defendants' argument.
if a person had one half mile of property abutting tht
road with only one gate and sold the one hundred feel
with the gate in, the rest of the property would be land
locked, as he hadn't established or reserved for himsell
a way out of his land, which of course is absurd in the
extreme. Incidentally the fence dividing the proper!)
from the road was down and actual access could be made
at most any point.

6

In consi<lering this problem it should be kept i11
miu<l the type of road we are dealing with. This is not a
restricted access road and there is absolutely no reasou
why any property owner cannot go onto the road at any
point. The road in front of plaintiff's property was
perfectly adequate for their needs and they were entitlfd to use it for their
The defendants also make much of the fact that
access to the south on Rubidoux Road can be obtained
hy the payment to the Happy Valley Inc. of $1500.
plus interest for a number of years. but this is a right
that the plaintiffs have always had and in addition they
always had the right to the road on the north end of the
property, which has now been taken away from them
maki11g the north half of the property practically useless. It is submitted that defendants Soter's Inc. could
use the land more judiciously in connection with the de\'elopment of its subdivision.

POINT II
Previously submitted by plaintiffs and as argued
by the defendant is submitted without further argument.
CONCLUSION
It is evident from the record and briefs that the dismissal was premature and the court should remand the
7

case for further proceedings with the requirement thal
the plaintiff be paid damages for what the loss proves
to be and that each of the other defendants be requireo ,
to prove their claim against the other defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
LOTHAIRE R. RICH
Attorney for Plaintiff & Appellant
No. 16 East Stratford Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah
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